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- By Michael H. Allen, Leora Amira, Victoria Arango, David W. Ayer, Helene Bach, Christopher R. Bailey, Ross J. Baldessarini, Kelsey Ball, Alan L. Berman, Marian E. Betz, Emily A. Biggs, R. Warwick Blood, Kathleen T. Brady, David A. Brent, Jeffrey A. Bridge, Gregory K. Brown, Anat Brunstein Klomek, A. Jacqueline Buchanan, Michelle J. Chandley, Tim Coffey, Jessica Coker, Yeates Conwell, Scott J. Crow, Collin L. Davidson, Yogesh Dwivedi, Stacey Espaillat, Jan Fawcett, Steven J. Garlow, Robert D. Gibbons, Catherine R. Glenn, Deborah Goebert, Erica Goldstein, Tina R. Goldstein, Madelyn S. Gould, Kelly L. Green, Alison M. Greene, Philip D. Harvey, Robert M. A. Hirschfeld, Donna Holland Barnes, Andres M. Kanner, Gary J. Kennedy, Stephen H. Koslow, Benoit Labonté, Alison M. Lake, William B. Lawson, Steve Leifman, Adam Lesser, Timothy W. Lineberry, Amanda L. McMillan, Herbert Y. Meltzer, Michael Craig Miller, Michael J. Miller, James A. Naifeh, Katharine J. Nelson, Charles B. Nemeroff, Alexander Neumeister, Matthew K. Nock, Jennifer H. Olson-Madden, Gregory A. Ordway, Michael W. Otto, Ghanshyam N. Pandey, Giampaolo Perna, Jane Pirkis, Kelly Posner, Anne Rohs, Pedro Ruiz, Molly Ryan, Alan F. Schatzberg, S. Charles Schulz, M. Katherine Shear, Morton M. Silverman, April R. Smith, Marcus Sokolowski, Barbara Stanley, Zachary N. Stowe, Sarah A. Struthers, Leonardo Tondo, Gustavo Turecki, Robert J. Ursano, Kimberly Van Orden, Anne C. Ward, Danuta Wasserman, Jerzy Wasserman, Melinda K. Westlund, Tracy K. Witte, Kseniya Yershova, Alexandra Zagoloff, Sidney Zisook
- Edited by Stephen H. Koslow, University of Miami, Pedro Ruiz, University of Miami, Charles B. Nemeroff, University of Miami
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- Book:
- A Concise Guide to Understanding Suicide
- Published online:
- 05 October 2014
- Print publication:
- 18 September 2014, pp vii-x
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Britain's Policy-Making Elite, the Naval Disarmament Puzzle, and Public Opinion, 1927–1932
- Gregory C. Kennedy
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- Article
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Between 1927 and 1932, the policy-making elite of the British Government was presented with a difficult problem. Postwar attempts to explain the origins of the First World War had resulted in the belief that arms production and competition had largely been responsible for instigating the conflict. Such a view became accepted by the general public in Britain. Specifically, the pre-1914 naval competition between Germany and Great Britain was thought to be one of the key events that had contributed directly to the outbreak of the war. Such fears concerning naval armaments were touted by peace activists as having been instrumental in assuring the success of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22. Yet, this simple explanation does not adequately illustrate the intricate and complex connections that were made between naval armaments and other issues related to Britain's international affairs. Rather than the simple possession of naval arms, British leaders feared that other pressing issues would lead to a re-occurrence of hostilities. Questions concerning world oil supplies, reparations, war debts, tariffs, the value of the pound and the gold standard, and, particularly, belligerent rights and freedom of the seas, were all viewed as having the potential to generate another international conflict. Thus, the existence of armaments themselves was not Britain's primary security problem from the perspective of the policy-making elite. Rather, their common cause was how to protect Britain's position as the center of a world economic system. Safeguarding Britain's own stable position as a focus that provided leadership for the rest of the world was seen as the logical step to ensuring global stability. In order to create an atmosphere of goodwill and security that was necessary to prevent volatile issues from exploding, the British governing elite treated naval arms talks and naval armaments as a form of currency in the realm of international relations.